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Abstract
The work studies the properties of a coordination game in which agents repeatedly compete
to be in the population minority. The game reects some essential features of those economic
situations in which positive rewards are assigned to individuals who behave in opposition to the
modal behavior in a population. Here we model a group of heterogeneous agents who adaptively
learn and we investigate the transient and long-run aggregate properties of the system in terms
of both allocative and informational eÆciency. Our results show that, rst, the system long-run
properties strongly depend on the behavioral learning rules adopted, and, second, adding noise
at the individual decision level and hence increasing heterogeneity in the population substantially
improve aggregate welfare, although at the expense of a longer adjustment phase. In fact, the
system achieves in that way a higher level of eÆciency compared to that attainable by perfectly
rational and completely informed agents.
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1 Introduction
This work investigates the dynamic properties of minority games under dierent forms of hetero-
geneity amongst agents and dierent learning procedures.
In the game, rst introduced by Challet and Zhang (1997, 1998), a population of N agents (where
N is an odd number) must each simultaneously and independently choose between two sides, say
0 and 1. The side chosen by the minority of the agents is the winning one - each gaining a xed
positive reward -, while all members on the majority side obtain a null payo.
Formally, the model is an N-person coordination game with multiple asymmetric Nash equilibria
in pure strategies, and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. In the following, we assume a
large population, and we investigate the conditions under which repeated interaction amongst players
causes some form of aggregate self-organization to emerge.
The game, notwithstanding its extreme simplicity, does capture some basic features of quite a few
processes of social and economic interactions whereby orderly coordination rests upon the existence
or the emergence of some behavioral heterogeneity in the relevant population.
Some coordination problems of this kind have long been discussed in Schelling's seminal work
on those patterns of \sorting and mixing" where order at an aggregate level might nd its roots in
persistent micro adjustments within heterogeneous populations (Schelling, 1978). They also bear a
close resemblance to the \El Farol" Problem devised by Brian Arthur (1994) . In this game, a number
of agents must independently decide each night whether or not to attend a bar called \El Farol".
Each agent receives a positive utility from attending the bar as long as this is not too crowded.
Otherwise he prefers to stay home. Somewhat similar coordination problems are involved in the
experimental market entry games [e.g., Ochs (1990), Meyer et al. (1992); Ochs (1995) and references
therein] where a group of N players must decide at each stage whether or not to enter one or more
markets each having a xed capacity k, with k < N .
Finally, the model captures some basic features of speculation on nancial markets - which has
been indeed the primary concern of minority-game modeling so far. A classic reference in this respect
is to Keynes' \Beauty Contest" metaphor, where the payo to an individual player does not stem
from the accuracy of the appreciation of the intrinsic beauty of various contest candidates but rather
from guessing the guesses of the ensemble of the other evaluators.
Strictly speaking, the beauty contest metaphor crucially involves positive feedback investment
strategies - in the language of technical trading in nance - since the payo is based on a majority rule,
while minority games (MG, hereafter) fundamentally address those aspects of speculation dynamics
involving activities of arbitrage against average market behaviors. These negative feedback strategies
characterize agents trying to infer some - actual or imagined - structure in the history of collective
interactions and, through that, trying to \beat the market" - that is, \beat the majority view" -
by arbitraging against it. In the literature on chartist rules, this roughly corresponds to contrarian
strategies [e.g., in the behavioral nance literature, De Bondt and Thaler (1995)].
In this work we shall precisely address the collective outcomes of such interactions in the MG
setup. Are orderly aggregate coordination and absence of arbitrage opportunities generic properties
of minority-type market processes, independently of any further specication of microeconomic be-
haviors? Or, conversely, do ner details of the ecology of agents populations (such as their sheer size)
and their decision processes (e.g., the number and degree of rational sophistication of their decision
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rules, their amount of memory, etc.) aect collective adjustment processes and long term outcomes?
Previous results on the MG based on adaptive agents with deterministic decision rules [e.g., Chal-
let and Zhang (1997, 1998); Savit et al. (1998)] do suggest that diverse degrees of market eÆciency
fundamentally depend upon some underlying heterogeneity in the population. Here we explore the
more general case whereby heterogeneous agents, endowed with memories of variable length, are
allowed to adaptively learn. Interestingly, rst, eÆcient coordination turns out robustly to be an
emergent property resting on an ecology of diverse agents who do not play Nash equilibrium strate-
gies. Second, we show that collective eÆciency is not monotonic either in the rational sophistication
of the agents nor in the information they are able to access. Rather, again, it crucially depends on
the ecology of behaviors over the population.
In Section 2 we briey illustrate the basic features of the game, study the properties of its
equilibria and introduce a notion of adaptive strategy. Section 3 discusses the role of heterogeneity for
collective dynamics under the assumption of strategies over the population and adaptive deterministic
behaviors. In Section 4 we introduce a probabilistic learning model and study both the transient
and limit properties of the dynamics. In particular, we analyze the allocative and informational
eÆciencies - which we shall dene below - of the system under dierent degrees of computational
complexity of the purported agents and dierent parameterizations of the learning rule. In general,
our results suggest that it is heterogeneity in the population rather than individual computational
abilities which mainly accounts for the observed aggregate properties.
2 The Minority Game
2.1 The Baseline Game-theoretic Framework
The minority game is played by a group N of players, where N must be an odd number. On each
period of the stage game, each player must choose privately and independently between two actions
or sides, say 0 and 1. The payo 
i
for i 2 f0; 1g is the same for all N players and is equal to

i
=
(
1 if n
i
 (N   1)=2
0 otherwise
(1)
where n
i
is the number of players choosing side i. Each player is rewarded with a unitary payo
whenever the side he chooses happens to be chosen by the minority of the players, while players on
the majority side get nil.
It is easy to see that the game has
 
N
(N 1)=2

asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies, in
which exactly (N   1)=2 players choose either one of the two sides. Clearly, under pure-strategy
equilibrium play, the payos for the two \parties" are quite dierent. Players belonging to the
minority side are rewarded a xed positive payo, while those on the majority side earn nothing.
The pure strategy equilibria, hence, are not strict, because players on the majority side are just
indierent between sticking to equilibrium play and deviating. The game also presents a unique
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, in which each players selects the two sides with equal
probability
1
.
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Of course, there are innite asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria.
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The Minority Game is a simple game of coordination, in which, however, the payo asymmetry
implied by the pure strategy Nash equilibria is likely to rule out simple precedent-based solutions
of the underlying coordination problem. The goodness of the achieved coordination can be easily
measured by the average size of the winning minority. The further this size is from (N   1)=2, the
higher is the amount of money which is, so to speak, left on the table, hence the lower the resulting
aggregate welfare. Note that under mixed strategy equilibrium play, individual expected payo is
equal to .5 on each period of the stage game, and the group payo follows a binomial distribution
with mean equal to N=2 and a variance of N=4. The measure of variance is indeed an equivalent
measure of the degree of eÆciency achieved in a population. The higher the variance, the higher
the magnitude of uctuations around the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the corresponding
aggregate welfare loss.
2.2 The Behavioral Foundations of the Minority Game: Adding Beliefs
Let us start by discussing the nature of the game equilibria when players choose their actions on the
basis of idiosyncratic (i.e. agent-specic) beliefs about other players' aggregate behavior, and try to
exploit the latter to their advantage. This perspective, which amounts to consider agents endowed
with inductive rather the deductive rationality, has been adopted in the minority literature including
the El Farol model (Arthur, 1994) and it is common to multi-agent accounts of nancial markets
[e.g., Arthur et al. (1997); Brock and Hommes (1998); LeBaron (2000) and references therein].
One way to model beliefs in this setting, which has traditionally been used in the previous
simulation studies on the MG, is to endow players with sets of adaptive strategies, where a strategy
may be dened as a function mapping a particular sequence of observed past outcomes up to a
certain period with an action to choose in the next period. In the following we show indeed that
an explicit account of this form of strategic behavior does not change the set of the mixed strategy
Nash equilibria of the game.
Consider a group of N agents who play the MG with a payo function
2
as from Eq. 1. The
only information made available after each round is the winning side (0 or 1). We dene the market
information as the (history) H of play, i.e., a binary string specifying which side has won in each
period of the stage game. We also dene a parameter m as the portion of the past history H that
players retain in memory. So, if m = 3, players' strategies will be based only on the outcomes
observed in the last 3 rounds of the game.
An adaptive strategy may be dened as a prescription on the action to take on the next round of
play (i.e., to choose 0 or 1) provided that a particular history (i.e., a particular sequence of m bits)
has been observed up to that point. For example, in the case in which m = 3, an example of strategy
is shown in Table 1.
The history columns specify all the possible sequences of aggregate outcomes (i.e., of winning
sides) in the last m periods; the action columns specify which action to choose on the next round
in correspondence to each particular sequence observed
3
. Given a certain value of the parameter m,
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Various modications of this payo function have been proposed by Challet and Zhang and by De Cara et al.
(1999)). We stick to the original one for its simplicity and because the essential features of the model are highly
insensitive to the proposed variations.
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Note again that this denition of strategy diers considerably from the notion of strategy as complete plan of action
used in standard game theory. Rather it represents \mental models" or \subjective beliefs" as in Arthur (1994) and
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the total number of strategies that can be generated is equal to 2
2
m
, corresponding to the 2
2
m
ways
of assigning either action to all the 2
m
possible binary strings of length m.
Given the foregoing denition of strategies, we study, as a rst important benchmark, the equi-
libria associated with the \homogenous" game where all the players have access to the full set of
strategies. Moreover, rather than considering the dynamics of the history string h, generated by the
successive players' choices, we begin by focusing on the static case requiring that all the strings h
can appear with equal probability
4
. Under this hypothesis, despite the high number of strategies, we
show that a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists by which players assign equal probability
to choosing either side, 1 and 0, regardless of past history. However, given the above denition of
strategy, there are actually innite ways in which players may end up choosing sides with equal
probability.
In order to clarify the analysis that follows, let us introduce some notation. A pure strategy
s 2 S
l
is a mapping H
l
! f0; 1g from the set of binary strings of length l to the set of actions.
Consequently, a mixed strategy m = fx

;  2 S
l
j
P
2S
l
x

= 1g can be thought as a map H
l
! [0; 1]
which associates to each binary string h 2 H
l
the probabilitym(h) =
P
2H
m
x

s(h) than the action
following it be 1. Let 
l
be the 2
2
l
dimensional mixed strategies simplex. For what follows, it
is important to notice that the actual mapping between the mixed strategies space and the space

2
l
[0; 1] of maps from H
l
to [0; 1] is many to one and surjective, i.e. there are many ways of building
up the same mixed strategy starting from the pure strategies set and each mixed strategy can be
realized in at least one way.
Consider a population of N (odd) agents. If m 2 
N

m
is a mixed strategy prole (the vector
composed by the players mixed strategies) we denote the mixed strategy of player i as m
i
and the
vector of mixed strategies of all players except i as m
 i
. The mixed strategy prole denes, for
each binary string, the population probability of playing 1 (the expected frequency of players playing
action 1) associated to a given binary string:
m(h) =
1
N
N
X
n=1
X
j2S
l
m
j
(h) =
X
j2S
m
P
j
( m)s
j
(h) (2)
where P
j
( m) is the expected probability of playing strategy j (the frequency with which this strategy
will be played).
The payo function in Eq.1 denes the expected payo of player i given the past history h and
the complete mixed strategy prole m:
U
m
i
; m
(h) = m
i
(h)(1   m(h)) + m(h)(1  m
i
(h)) (3)
and we say that a mixed strategy m
1
is superior to m
2
if, given the mixed strategy prole m, it is
U
m
1
; m
(h)  U
m
2
; m
(h), 8h 2 H
l
. This denition allows one to discuss equilibria in a way similar to
what is done in more canonical population games.
Theorem The strategy prole m is a Nash equilibrium i m
i
(h) = 1=2, 8m
i
2 m, 8h 2 H
l
Marengo and Tordjman (1996).
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This prescription is introduced for purposes of analytical tractability and stems from a symmetry consideration:
there is no reason for a player to assign ex-ante a greater probability to a particular history string.
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The meaning is rather straightforward: a mixed strategy prole is a Nash equilibrium only when
the players' mixed strategies assign probability one half to pick either side, 1 and 0 irrespectively of
the past history, i.e. when all the players are perfectly symmetric random players. Notice, however,
that the ways of realizing such a mixed strategy are innite. Hence, the actual number of mixed
strategy Nash equilibria is also innite.
Proof
In order to demonstrate the assertion we proceed by identifying the i-th player's best replies to
a given mixed strategy prole m
 i
for the rest of the population. For this purpose, it is convenient
to express the payo in Eq. 3 isolating the contribution of the i-th player's strategy from that of the
rest of the population:
U
m
i
; m
 i
(h) =
N + 1
N
m
i
(h) +
N   1
N
m
 i
(h)  
2
N
m
i
(h)
2
 
2(N   1)
N
m
i
(h) m
 i
(h) (4)
and m
i
(h) has to be chosen in order to maximize the foregoing expression. The solution depends on
the value of m
 i
(h) and the quadratic form of Eq. 4 allows one to immediately nd it. Dening
p

(h) =
N + 1  2(N   1) m
 i
(h)
4
(5)
the solution reads
m^
i
(h) =
8
>
<
>
:
0 p

(h)  0
1 p

(h)  1
p

(h) otherwise
(6)
The same procedure can be repeated for each string h to obtain the best reply mixed strategy to
m
 i
(h). In order to obtain the set of Nash equilibria, we have to nd strategies that belong to the
set of mutual best replies, i.e. m^
i
(h) = m
 i
(h), 8h 2 H
l
. Inspecting Eq. 6, it turns out that this can
happen only when 0 < p

(h) < 1 and the following condition is satised
m
 i
(h) =
N + 1  2(N   1) m
 i
(h)
4
(7)
The solution is then m
 i
(h) = 1=2, implying m^
i
(h) = 1=2.
Q.E.D.
3 The Minority Game with Heterogeneous Agents
One of the interesting questions one may explore in the MG framework is whether and how the
presence of heterogeneity among players' beliefs may impact on the system degrees of self-organization
around the Nash equilibria of the game.
In line with previous simulation studies by Challet and Zhang, one may introduce heterogeneity
in the population via a diversity of strategies. Given a certain value of m, each player is initially
endowed with a number s of strategies which are randomly drawn from a common pool. Hence,
although both m and s are identical over the population, heterogeneity arises from the random
initial strategy assignments.
In the course of play, each active strategy i is characterized by a value q
i
(t), which indicates the
total number of points accumulated by that strategy at time t. Indeed, after each period of the game,
5
all the strategies that have made a correct prediction in that period (i.e., all strategies prescribing
the choice of the side which ex post resulted the winning side) are assigned one point each.
Given the initial strategy assignment and the updating rule just described, players' behavior at
each round of the stage game is completely deterministic, as each agent picks, among the strategies
he possesses, the one with the highest number of accumulated points.
Note that in such a framework, however, agents' heterogeneity is only introduced via the initial
assignment of strategies to players and does not stem from dierent \personal histories". If, for
example, the same strategy i is initially assigned to two dierent players, the value of q
i
(t), which
determines the strength of that strategy at time t will necessarily be the same for both players, as it
will only depend on the number of times that strategy has made a correct prediction whether it was
actually played or not.
In order to evaluate the population's performance, it is necessary to introduce a measure of
allocative eÆciency. A natural candidate is provided by the average number of players belonging to
the winning party, i.e. the average number of points earned by the whole population
5
. In accordance
with the previous literature, as a measure of allocative eÆciency we compute a quantity associated
to the foregoing one, namely the mean squared deviation from the half population, . Let N be the
number of agents, and N
0
(t) the number of agents choosing side 0 at time t, then in a repeated game
of duration T the mean squared deviation is computed as
 =
1
T
T
X
=0
(N
0
() 
N
2
)
2
: (8)
Clearly, the lower the value of , the higher the system eÆciency.
The dynamic process can be expected to depend to some degree on the initial strategy distribution
and on the initial game history, which are both generated randomly. Therefore, in order to eliminate
any dependence on initial conditions from our results and to focus only on asymptotically stable
states, in all the simulations presented here we applied an averaging procedure over 50 independent
sample paths with randomly generated initial histories and strategy distributions.
In addition, at the beginning of each simulation the system was left to evolve for an initial
\adjustment phase" of length T
0
in order to wash away any possible transient eects on the subsequent
averaging procedure. The quantities so obtained can thus be considered asymptotic properties of the
system as long as T
0
and T are chosen high enough as to provide a good approximation of the limit
T !1.
The dependence of the volatility measure  on N , m and s for the original minority game has
been thoroughly investigated in the previous simulation studies and is summarized in Fig. 1 for the
case s = 2.
As noticed by Savit et al. (1998), the type of market regime is determined, at least in rst
approximation, by the ratio z = 2
m
=N : hence the curves for various N collapse if plotted in this
variable. In this respect, notice that even if the actual number of possible strategies is 2
2
m
, their
relative strengths are completely dened in term of the frequency P (0jh
m
) with which, over a history,
a 0 follows a given m length string h
m
. And there are 2
m
of such variables. So, z can be interpreted
as the density of agents in the strategy space degrees-of-freedom.
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Recall from the previous Section that this quantity measures the degree to which the population is close to a Nash
equilibrium, whether pure or mixed strategy.
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As shown in Fig. 1 three dierent regimes of the system can be identied. First, a \random
regime" occurs when z is large (the agent are sparse in the strategy space). Here the system can
hardly organize and its behavior can be described as a collection of random agents choosing their
side with a coin toss. In fact suppose the past history to be a given h
m
and suppose there are
N
d
(h
m
) agents whose strategies prescribe dierent actions based on that history while there are
N
0
(h
m
) and N
1
(h
m
) agents whose strategies prescribe the same party (we restrict ourselves to the
s = 2 case), respectively 0 and 1. If the agent in N
d
choose randomly, the variance is (h
m
) =
N
d
(h
m
)=4 + (N
0
(h
m
)   N
1
(h
m
))
2
=4. The average over the possible h
m
will then give  = N=4.
Notice that  is shaped by two factors, namely a uctuation in the choices of agents able to choose
and a uctuation in the initial distribution of strategies. Note also that the allocative eÆciency in
this case (as measured by ) equals that of a population of players playing the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium dened over the two actions 0 and 1 (cf. Section 2.1).
The second regime could be called the \ineÆcient regime" for z << 1. Here the agents densely
populate the strategy space, and their actions are strongly correlated. This correlation leads to a
worsening of the overall performance due to a \crowd" eect (Johnson et al. 1998): the agents in
fact are too similar to each other and they all tend to choose the same party on the basis of the
available information.
The third regime for z  1 is where coordination produces a better-than-random performance.
Here the agents are dierentiated enough not to yield \crowd" eects, but at the same time suÆciently
distributed over the strategy space so as not to produce a random-like behavior.
The literature on the MG in fact, has mostly focused on the criticality of the value z
c
where  is
minimum, suggesting that a major change in the system behavior happens when this point is crossed
(Challet and Marsili, 1999). As we will see in the following sections, this criticality survives to the
introduction of the probabilistic learning rules.
4 Adaptive Learning
4.1 The Model
What happens to the system properties when additional heterogeneity is introduced in the popula-
tion? In particular, what happens when agents are endowed with a probabilistic decision rule? In
order to tackle the problem, in the following we investigate changes in the dynamics and asymp-
totic properties of a population of agents playing the MG as a function of changes in the nature of
the agents' learning models. Hence, we leave unaltered the setup previously described, and modify
only the way in which agents update their strategies' relative strength. In particular, we adopt the
following probabilistic updating rule.
Recall the denition of q
i
(t) as the total number of points strategy i would have won if played
until time t. Then each agent chooses among her strategies following the probability distribution:
p
i
(t) =
e
q
i
(t)
P
j
e
q
j
(t)
: (9)
where the sum on j is over all the strategies possessed by the player. Note that, in general, dierent
players will assign dierent probabilities to the same strategy due to the dierent strategy endow-
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ments. Hence, the introduction of a probabilistic learning rule adds noise at the individual level and
it also increases heterogeneity in the population.
The choice of a stochastic learning model is well supported by the available experimental evi-
dence on adaptive behavior in games as well as by evidence from psychology experiments. In fact,
most descriptive models of adaptive learning, whether belief-based or reinforcement-based, imply a
probabilistic choice and updating of available actions [cf. Erev and Roth (1998), Camerer and Ho
(1999)].
The parameter  can be considered as a sort of sensitivity of choice to marginal information: when
it is high, the agents are sensitive even to little dierences in the notional score of their strategies.
In the limit for  !1 the usual minority game rule is recovered. On the contrary, for low values of
 a great dierence in the strategies' strengths is required in order to obtain signicant dierences
in probabilities.
The model indeed bears close similarities with a discrete time replicator dynamics (see Weibull
(1995)). The connection is straightforward if one looks at the probability updating equation associ-
ated with Eq. 9:
p
i
(t+ 1) = p
i
(t)
e
 Æq
i
(t)
P
j
p
j
(t)e
 Æq
j
(t)
: (10)
where Æq
i
(t) = q
i
(t+1) q
i
(t) are the points won by strategy i at time t. If one thinks of a continuous
process Æq
i
(t) = _q
i
(t)Æt, where _q
i
(t) is the instantaneous \tness" of strategy i, then the continuous
time replicator dynamics equation is recovered keeping only the rst terms in Æt expansion:
_p
i
(t)
p
i
(t)
= _q
i
(t) 
X
j
p
j
(t) _q
j
(t) (11)
4.2 Transient length
In everything that follows we will restrict our analysis to the case N = 101 and s = 2 and we will
speak of the optimal value for memory length m
o
with reference to the value of m which minimizes
 under this parameter choice
6
.
Let us consider the problem of dening the correct values for T
0
and T in Eq. 8 above. The
central question is: How long must the system be left evolving before it reaches the asymptotically
stable dynamics? Fig. 2 plots the average  value based on the \deterministic" (i.e.  = +1) MG
as a function of the time length T over which this average is taken with a transient T
0
= T . As it
can be seen from the graph, the values used in the literature on the MG are generally suÆcient to
obtain a prediction correct to few percentage points. However, two properties are worth noticing:
 The system approaches the asymptotic value from above, intuitively suggesting that the system
\learns" over time to self-organize
 For low values of m, in the \ineÆcient regime", and for high value of m, in the \random
regime",the system reaches a stable dynamic quite fast. On the contrary, for values of m near
the optimal value m
o
, the system takes a longer time to self-organize
6
The choice to set s=2 is justied by the fact that the system exhibits the same qualitative properties for any s  2,
while reducing to a trivial case for s=1.
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Consider now the case in which the learning rule is the one described in Eq. 9, shown in Fig.3. For
high values of  this learning rule approaches the standard one, and accordingly, the transient length
is similar to the one found in such cases. However, as  decreases, the length generally increases. The
increase is most dramatic for values of m near the optimal value m
o
, and it progressively disappears
for higher values of m. The interpretation of such a result stems from the meaning of  in terms
of the learning rule. Supposing non trivial dynamics for m near m
o
, the parameter  sets the time
scale on which such dynamics are attained.
As an illustration, consider the following example: Let be r(t) = p
1
(t)=p
2
(t) the ratio of the
probabilities that an agent associates to his two strategies, and q(t) = q
1
(t)   q
2
(t) the dierence
in their respective strengths. From Eq. 9 it follows that r(t) = e
q(t)
. Assuming that the dierence
in the two strategies performance holds constant over time (an assumption which is generally true in
the initial transient regime where agents' behavior is basically random) we obtain q(t)  t: hence,
from the equality above, a given dierence in probability is obtained at a time which is inversely
proportional to .
In order to estimate the time scale over which the system long-run properties are attained, we use
the following procedure. Holding all the parameters and the initial conditions constant, the system
volatility can be expressed as a function of both the transient phase duration, and of the time length
over which it is averaged, i.e.  = (T; T
0
). Starting from a reference time T
r
,
7
we compute the mean
volatility progressively doubling T and T
0
, and thus obtaining a series of values 
n
= (2
n
T
r
; 2
n
T
r
).
When the relative variation j
n
  
n 1
j=
n
falls below a xed threshold , we stop and take the last
computed value of  as an estimate of its asymptotic value. The corresponding time length
^
T () will
be an estimate of the time implied by the system to reach this asymptotic state. As can be seen
in Fig. 6 the increase in
^
T when  is lowered is mainly concentrated around m
o
, with shapes that
suggest the presence of a regime discontinuity.
4.3 Allocative eÆciency
In order to analyze the asymptotic properties of (m) for dierent 's, we use the procedure just
described regarding the calculation of
^
T , i.e. we leave the system evolve until \stability" is reached
8
.
The simulation results are plotted in Fig. 5. Interestingly, when  decreases, the performance level
of the system generally increases. Moreover, such increase is larger the lower the value of m, and it
becomes negligible form  m
0
. The observed behavior is consistent with the idea that for high values
of m, the system dynamics tends to be determined by the initial distribution of strategies among
players, while players themselves have no opportunity to attain a higher performance by adjusting
their behavior. Recall that an increasing m means an increasing number of possible strategies over
which players may initially draw. For a xed N , the \ecology" of drawn strategies becomes thinner as
compared to the notionally available ones. That phenomenon, it turns out, prevents the system from
self-organizing. Note that this property is quite robust and largely independent from the particular
learning rule adopted. Our results, in fact, are perfectly in line with previous simulation studies in
the high m region.
7
Note that the chosen value for T
0
is irrelevant as long as it is small compared to the typical time scale.
8
Let us emphasize that the stable state does not imply point convergence to any state but simply long-run stability
of the relevant time-averages (e.g., the mean volatility ) even if the system continues to uctuate in its limit state.
9
Conversely, for low values of m, the choice of the particular learning rule adopted does matter in
terms of aggregate eÆciency. In fact, when m is small, the original learning rule ( =1) produces
a \crowd" eect (corresponding to large groups of agents choosing the same side) which, due to
homogeneity in the initial strategy endowments, prevents the system from attaining a high degree of
eÆciency
9
. On the contrary, the introduction of a probabilistic learning rule for the strategy choice
acts like a brake that dumps the amplitude of such correlated uctuations. At the individual level, this
corresponds to lower 's, i.e. to higher degrees of \inertia", as agents update their probabilities more
slowly. In other words, as  decreases each agent behaves as if he was applying a sort of stochastic
ctitious play approximation [e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998)]
10
, with an implicit assumption of
stationarity on the distribution of other agents' choices. If the whole population shares the same
 - as in the present model - the assumption is, in a way, self-fullling: a decrease in  makes the
behavior of the population as a whole change at a slower pace. A slower probability updating at
the individual level and the resulting more stable collective behavior, together, imply that  is a
non increasing function of . In fact, if the system reaches a dynamical stability via an averaging
procedure over the past outcomes, increasing the time scale over which averaging occurs cannot rule
out previously attainable equilibria.
However, note that in order to capture the long run eÆciency properties of the system for low
values of  it is necessary to let the population play until stability is reached, according to the
procedure described above. Our results, in fact, were not captured by previous simulation studies
(Cavagna et al., 1999). Since the latter were all performed with a xed time length their conclusion
was that when  is small enough, the system behavior resembles the behavior of a random system.
This nding was in fact due to both the increase in the transient length and the purely random initial
dynamics which occur when  is decreased. Then, by xing a time length, for small values of  the
simulations capture throughout the adjustment phase, and the system behavior perfectly mirrors
that of a collection of agents who choose at random (indeed our results of a xed time simulation
are plotted in Fig. 6 and are perfectly in line with the existing literature
11
).
As can be seen in Fig. 5 the performance attainable in the MG via a collective organization of
agents with limited information and limited ability to choose is, in general, surprisingly high. In the
following we show that the level of eÆciency achieved in the double limit  ! 0 and m! 0 actually
equals that attainable with hypothetical perfectly informed and perfectly rational agents endowed
with a greater exibility in choice.
Consider for instance a collection of agents with the following characteristics: each agent is
assigned S = 2 strategies, and a vector of length 2
m
containing the probability p(h
m
) of playing
according to its rst strategy after the occurrence of the history string h
m
. Moreover, for each h
m
,
each agent knows the values of N
0
(h
m
), N
1
(h
m
) and N
d
(h
m
) indicating respectively the number
of agents for which their strategies both prescribe to play 0, both to play 1, or to play dierently.
Assuming that the game structure and the amount of information available to agents is common
knowledge and that the agents are perfectly rational, the problem completely factorizes and, for each
9
In some sense, one can interpret the \crowd" eect as a collective form of overreaction (Thaler, 1993).
10
Note that ctitious play implies that a player best responds to the observed frequency of the opponent's play.
11
In other words, to discover the asymptotic properties of the system, the limits T ! 1 and  ! 0 have to be
performed in this order.
10
hm
, every agent in N
d
(h
m
) will solve the game analytically choosing p(h
m
) in order to minimize
(N
1
(h
m
) N
0
(h
m
))
2
  p(h
m
)N
d
(h
m
) (12)
i.e. making the average fraction of the population choosing a given side as near to N=2 as possible.
This choice will produce a volatility   N
d
=4 = N=8 which is roughly similar to what obtained in
the simulation shown in Fig. 5 in the low m, low  region
12
. However, note that, as from Fig.5,
these fully rational, fully informed players are (on average) \beaten" by a set of \self-organizing"
agents with memory m  m
o
, reaching a nearly double eÆciency.
A nal remark concerns the variance of the distribution of  as a function of  for various m's,
as shown in Fig. 7: when  decreases the variance of  decreases for any m. However it remains
three times greater for m = m
o
suggesting a stronger dependence of the asymptotic performance
on the initial strategy assignment which the system is not able to wash out. That is, signicant
path-dependence eects are present.
4.4 Informational eÆciency
What we have been calling allocative eÆciency basically highlights the collective ability of capturing
the payos which the game notionally allows. A complementary issue regards the informational eÆ-
ciency of the market process, i.e., the extent to which the future system outcomes are unpredictable,
or, in other words, the absence of any arbitrage opportunities. Thus, let us analyze the informational
content of the binary string H of successive winning sides. Let p(0jh
l
) be the probability that a 0
follows a given string h
l
of all the possible 2
l
strings of length l (as depicted in Fig. 8).
For the original \deterministic" MG the analysis performed in Savit et al. leads to the identi-
cation of two regimes: a \partially eÆcient regime" for m < m
o
in which p(0jh
l
)  :5;8h
l
as long as
l  m and in which no informational content is left for strategies with memory less or equal to the
one used by the agents; and an \ineÆcient regime" for m > m
o
in which the distribution of p(0jh
l
)
is not at, even for l  m, meaning there are good strategies that might exploit the market signal to
obtain dierential prots. For l > m both the regions show a non trivial distribution p(0jh
l
) with an
increasing degree of \ruggedness" as l increases. The eect of introducing some degree of behavioral
randomness through the parameter  leads to the obvious eect of reducing the \ruggedness" of the
distribution of p(0jh
l
) (see Fig 8).
In order to study the behavior of the system as  changes we introduce two related quantities
which can be used to characterize the informational content of the time series. The rst is the
conditional entropy S(l) dened as:
S(l) =  
X
h
l
p(h
l
)
X
i2f0;1g
p(ijh
l
) log p(ijh
l
) (13)
where the summation is intended over all the possible strings of length l and p(h
l
) is the frequency of
a given string in the system history H. The maximum value S(l) = 1 is reached for a at distribution
p(0jh
l
) = :5; and it corresponds to the impossibility of forecasting (in probability) the next outcome
12
We are assuming N = N
1
(h
m
) N
0
(h
m
) < N
d
(h
m
). Notice that for random agents N 
p
(N) and N
d
 N
and that one can neglect the N=N
d
terms in the solution of Eq. 12 when N is large.
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based on the previous l outcomes. The idea that the information content can be used to \exploit the
market" leads to the denition of a second quantity A(l):
A(l) =
X
h
l
p(h
l
)max fp(0jh
l
); p(1jh
l
)g (14)
which is the average fraction of points won by the best strategy of memory l. This is a measure of
the reward obtained by the best arbitrageur with memory l ( whereas if no arbitrage opportunities
are present A(l) is equal to :5.)
Before analyzing the behavior of these quantities when  is varied, let us briey consider as a sort
of ideal benchmark the properties of a population composed of perfectly rational, perfectly informed,
agents with common knowledge of strategy distributions. Not surprisingly, in these circumstances the
problem factorizes for each past history and the dependence on m disappears. The history produced
by such a system is a random series of 0 and 1. Indeed the number of agents choosing one side is
distributed according to a binomial around N=2 with dierent widths for dierent h
m
. In particular,
this means that in such an extreme case the \memory" loses any predicting power and no arbitrage
opportunity is left for agents with longer memory, i.e. no residual information is left in the time series
and the behavior of agents makes the market perfectly eÆcient from an informational point of view.
In the last resort, there is nothing to be learned from any history because agents know everything
from the start and coordinate their mixed strategies accordingly. Under this assumption we expect
S  1 and A  :5.
Short of such an ideal case where the market loses its coordinating role, because agents ex ante
generate the coordination \in their heads", let us consider, for example, a population of \random
agents". Here, due to the unbalance in the initial strategy endowments we expect a non trivial
structure to appear for every l; thus S < 1 and A > :5.
In Fig. 9 we plot S(l) and A(l) for histories generated with a value of m < m
0
, in the \partially
eÆcient regime". The eect of decreasing  shows up when l > m but the information content for
high l is never completely eliminated. The market becomes less eÆcient the larger the time scale l
at which it is observed. In fact it can be shown under very general assumptions that certain strings
in the history are more abundant than others (Savit et al., 1998) and the long-range correlation that
was responsible for the \crowd" eect at high  survives as a non trivial structure in p(0jh
l
) for high
l. All this applies despite the fact that to an agent with memory l  m the market appears perfectly
eÆcient regardless of the  value.
For values of m > m
0
in the \ineÆcient phase" the eect is in some sense reversed. As can be
seen in Fig. 10 the eect of decreasing  is again negligible for l  m but in the limit  ! 0 the
curve becomes at for l > m. This last result deserves some comments: the atness in l  m means
that no gain is achieved from inspecting the time series with a very long memory l >> m because
no more arbitrage opportunities are open for a longer memory agent than the best possible agent
of memory m. The market can be considered to be, again, partially eÆcient in the sense that it
generates an upper bound on the maximal attainable arbitrage capability which does not depend on
the arbitrageur memory.
The particular form of the conditional entropy in Fig. 10 suggests that in the limit  ! 0
the system can be described as a Markov chain of memory m
13
. The result can be explained
13
Notice that by construction, in the learning rules considered here the past is not discounted, and the agents weigh
12
by noticing that when  is small only great dierences in the past performances of strategies are
relevant and in the limit  ! 0 only innite dierences become relevant. Putting it another way, the
frequency of victories of the various strategies becomes constant implying the formation of a static
hierarchical structure in the strategy space which at the end is responsible of the Markov character
of the resulting history. The appearance of \best strategies" in m > m
o
region is well revealed by
the plot of the average score by the best strategy versus the average point scored by the player (see
Fig. 11): a correlation in fact appears between the performance of a player and the performance of
its best strategy. Moreover, in the m  m
o
region a sub-population showing the same kind of high
correlation coexists with another group that presents no correlation, composed of agents possessing
two equally performing strategies.
Conversely, only in the low m region no strategy ends up being preferable to others and no player
is bound to lose due only to his initial strategy endowment.
Notice, however, that equivalence between strategies does not necessarily imply equivalence in
the agents' performances. This is highlighted by the plot of the variances and the supports of the
points distribution for dierent values of  and m in Fig. 12. Interestingly, only for low m and low 
does equivalence in strategy performance imply a relatively uniform distribution of points over the
population. In the other parameter regions learning does not eliminate performance heterogeneity
over the population. Loosely speaking, the market self-organizes over an ecology of \mental models"
and players, entailing the long-run coexistence of relative \winners" and \suckers".
5 Conclusions and Outlook
One of the central questions we addressed in this work is the extent to which market dynamics
generated by arbitraging activities, as represented in Minority Games, display generic properties,
independent from particular behavioral assumptions. Our answer is largely negative: simple varia-
tions in the agents' learning algorithms, we show, yield important modications in the asymptotic
properties of the system.
More specically, we show that less sensitivity to marginal information, i.e., more inertia in the
learning algorithm entails improved long-run collective performances, although at the expense of
longer adjustment phases. Together, performance asymmetries across agents, as measured by the
variance (or analogously) the support of the earnings distribution over the population, fall as inertia
in the agents' behavior increases.
In general, some degrees of randomness help in improving allocative and informational eÆciencies
of the market - as dened above. The major eect of randomness is that it performs like a brake
on the system dynamics, thus preventing groups of players who densely populate the strategy space
from acting in a strongly correlated way and thus from producing \crowd" eects which worsen the
system performance
14
.
their strategies on the basis of all the game outcomes starting from the beginning of the simulation (however, see the
Appendix for an analysis of the system properties when a time decaying factor is introduced).
14
The introduction of randomness in individual behavior is indeed only one of possible ways to maintain behavioral
heterogeneity in the population. For instance, the same eect has been obtained in De Cara et al. (2000) by substituting
the \global" evaluation of strategies on the system history H with a \personal" evaluation in which each agent uses
the binary string made up of her own record of victories. A diversication mechanism is again at work breaking the
13
Table 2 summarizes the dierent system properties - i.e. dierent market \regimes" - conditional
on dierent ecologies of strategies (as captured by the parameters z = 2
m
=N and  respectively).
Indeed, one of our major conclusions, which renes over previous results in the Minority Game
literature, is that market eÆciency - in the complementary denitions proposed above - is only
achieved in correspondence of an \optimal degree" of heterogeneity, whether in the agents' decision
behavior or in their underlying sets of beliefs. Moreover, our results suggest, more rationality - as
approximated here by a greater ability of the agents to track novel environmental information - may
well lower average performances (an analogous result is obtained in a dierent setup by Brock and
Hommes (1989)).
The general sensitivity of system dynamics upon particular learning algorithms also indicates a
natural way forward, beyond the exercises presented in this work, experimenting with cognitively less
demanding learning rules. So, for example, it would be interesting to explore the properties of pure
reinforcement learning whereby agents update only the strategies they play. That would also set a
\zero-level" model in terms of degrees of required information and cognitive abilities - somewhat at
the extreme opposite to the models studied so far in the Minority Game literature. And, somewhere
inbetween, one might explore more rened learning models such as that in Easley and Rustichini
(1999).
Moreover, beyond the strict setup of Minority Games so far, the impact of phenomena of social
imitation still awaits to be studied
15
. And, more generally, the robustness of the foregoing conclusions
ought to be checked in less \reduced form", institutionally richer models, such as articial markets
of the type outlined in Marengo and Tordjman (1996), Arthur et al. (1997) and Chiaromonte and
Dosi (1998) [e.g., Kirman (1999) for a review].
Finally, a complementary line of inquiry regards the analysis of behaviors and learning of human
subjects under experimental settings isomorphic to the market interactions formalized above.
In the last resort, all these latter exercises, together with the results presented here ought to be
considered as adding some pieces of evidence to the much broader eort aimed at identifying the
variables which determine a \universality class", if any, of market processes involving coordination
cum heterogeneity, as distinguished from those characteristics which strictly depend upon specic
distributions of beliefs and learning rules. Were our results conrmed in further studies, they would
add strength to the conjecture that eÆcient coordination might not stem from the adherence of
populations of agents to Nash equilibrium behaviors, but rather emerge out of persistent forms of
heterogeneity in beliefs and behaviors within the population.
6 Appendix
Many authors, especially in the experimental literature [e.g., Erev and Roth, (1998)] add to the
description of the learning process one more parameter, connected with the idea that agents weigh
more the information they received in the recent history as compared to the one coming from far
back in the past. This parameter typically takes the form of a decay factor. If 
i
(t) are the points
scored by strategy i at time t and  (0 <   1) the information decay factor, the updating rule for
correlation among agents.
15
A germane model of nancial dynamics with stochastic choice and social imitation is Kirman (1993).
14
the total strength becomes
q
i
(t+ 1) = q
i
(t) + 
i
(t) (15)
and the associated updating rule for the probabilities:
p
i
(t+ 1) = p

i
(t)
e
q
i
(t)
P
j
p

j
(t)e
q
j
(t)
: (16)
The eect of introducing such a \memory leakage" is twofold: First, it puts an upper limit to the
maximal strength any strategy could reach, namely 1=(1   ). Second, in presence of no informa-
tion ux, the equiprobability between strategies is steadily restored. This eect implies that if one
takes the limit  ! 0 keeping the value of  constant, the system will converge to a collection of
random agents. In turn, this implies that agents, loosely speaking, have to collect a larger amount
of information before they start behaving as a self-organized system.
The eect of introducing \forgetting" in the learning rule is easily understood: if the agents forget
more rapidly than they learn they are always bounded to less eÆcient behavior. Indeed ,as can be
seen from Fig. 13, if the value of  is decreased the eÆciency of the system is proportionally reduced.
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history action history action
000 1 100 1
001 0 101 0
010 0 110 1
011 1 111 0
Table 1: An example of strategy with m = 3.
low z high z
low  high A.E., high I.E. partial A.E., partial I.E.
high  low A.E., high I.E. partial A.E., low I.E.
Table 2: System properties: a summary (A.E. and I.E. stand for Allocative and Informational
EÆciency, respectively.)
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Figure 1: The volatility (z) for s = 2 and dierent values of N and m.
10
100 1000 10000 100000
(T )
T
m = 2
m = 3
m = 4
m = 5
m = 6
m = 7
m = 8
m = 10
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
?
?
? ? ?
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ?
Figure 2: The mean  along the run length for dierent m's. The points are averages over a sample
of 30 independent runs with N = 101 and s = 2.
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Figure 3:  along the run length T for dierent 's. The points are averages over a sample of 30
independent runs with a transient time T
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Figure 5: Volatility  for s = 2, N = 101 and various m's and 's. The runs are performed by
doubling the time length T until the last two values obtained dier by less than 1%.
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) of obtaining a 0 following a given binary string h
l
in the system history
for m = 3 and l = m + 1 = 4. When  is reduced the distribution \attens" and any structure
disappears.
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Figure 9: Conditional entropy S(l) (left) and arbitrage opportunity A(l) (right) as a function of the
time depth l for m = 3 < m
o
.
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Figure 10: Conditional entropy S(l) (left) and arbitrage opportunity A(l) (right) as a function of the
time depth l for m = 6 > m
o
.
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Figure 11: Plot, for each player, of the scoring rate of his best strategy against his own winning rate
for a population of 101 players over 30 independent runs with  = :04.
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Figure 12: Variance (rectangle) and support (straight line) of the scored points distribution in a
population of N = 101 with s = 2, over 30 independent runs. Notice that while in the high 
simulations the distributions are similar in width for any m, when  is reduced the low m region
emerges as the \socially optimal" one.
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Figure 13:  as a function of the run length T for dierent values of  and . The simulations
are performed with m = 6 where a greater sensitivity of the transient time length to the learning
parameters  and  is expected (see Section 4.2).
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